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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BANKRUPTCY BY INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND AGENT CERTIFICATIONS.  
 
Bankruptcy is a part of society in the United States.  In a twelve month period that ended 
September 30, 2006, there were 1,112,542 bankruptcy filings.1  Many readers may believe that a 
high number of businesses that filing for bankruptcy saturate that number.  That seems like a 
logical assumption; however, the fact is that individuals represent 1,085,209 of those filings.2  
Even though this number has decreased by over 25% from 2005, most likely as a result of the 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, individuals will continue to file for bankruptcy.3  As a result 
of the high amount of individuals filing for bankruptcy every year, debtors represent a wide 
variety of occupations and professions.  This paper will focus on one group of professional, 
sports agents, and the Bankruptcy Code’s effect on these debtors.  
 There are a variety of professional sports leagues with which one may become a player’s 
representative, a.k.a certified agent.  Each of the professional sports leagues promulgated its own 
agent regulatory system and certification processes; therefore, each one must be examined 
separately to determine the Bankruptcy Code’s effect on certified agents with that specific 
league.  The National Football League (“NFL”) is one of the four major sports leagues in the 
United States.  This paper will analyze the Bankruptcy Code’s effect on the agent certification 
issued by the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”)4 with the intent of 
identifying whether these agent certifications should be included as property of the debtor-
agent’s bankruptcy estate.  This decision may seem inconsequential in the realm of the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  This assumption may lead people to believe that discussion of this topic 
is unimportant or a waste of time.  However, as will be discussed, the court’s decision could strip 
a debtor of any opportunity to earn a living or could prevent a debtor from satisfying his or her 
debts to the creditors.5    
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This paper begins by giving a brief overview of the important bankruptcy filings which 
will lay a foundation for understanding bankruptcy in this context.  In particular, the overview 
focuses on the two most prevalent bankruptcy filings by individuals, chapter 7 and chapter 13.6  
This overview lays the ground work for understanding what happens to the “property” that 
becomes a part of the bankruptcy estate.  After the overview of bankruptcy, there is a brief 
summary of the NFLPA, its regulations and its agent certification process.  The synopsis of the 
NFLPA and its structure is followed by the importance of bankruptcy in relation to these agent 
certifications.  Before delving into the background of this paper, there is one point that needs to 
be addressed in order to prevent confusion.  The words “certification” and “license” are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper since courts do not distinguish the two words.  In fact, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that a license and certification are substantially similar, the 
only difference being the issuing party.7   
The number of certified agents and the number of bankruptcy filings consistently remain 
high; yet, case law and scholars have failed to address the issue of whether agent certifications 
are property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  There are numerous cases dealing with 
certifications in other professions; however, in dealing with the unique world of professional 
sports and their agents, there is no guidance.  In addition, the cases dealing with other 
certifications, the courts are split on whether those certifications should be property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  Further complicating the matter, there are numerous sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code that address the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over the debtor’s assets.  
Therefore, courts typically examine the certification under one section but not all of the pertinent 
sections.  This creates a lack of uniformity in case law precedent across jurisdictions and 
uncertainty among debtors, creditors, bankruptcy trustees, and bankruptcy judges.  
 - 3 -
 There are numerous goals that this paper intends to accomplish.  The first goal is to 
provide a description of the strict and strenuous agent certification and regulation process.  The 
second goal is to provide an understanding of how a perceived “simple” decision on whether to 
include a certification in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate can result in major consequences to the 
parties involved in the proceeding.  However, the main goal is to analyze the NFLPA’s agent 
certifications under the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code and the progeny of case law 
interpreting these sections.  Furthermore, the analysis will extend to the policy considerations in 
deciding whether or not the agent certification is property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  This 
analysis combined with the policy considerations will lead to the conclusion that the NFLPA 
issued agent certifications should not be considered property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.            
  
A. THE PURPOSE OF BANKRUPTCY AND ITS MOST COMMONLY USED CHAPTERS. 
 
 Throughout the development of and amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, legal scholars 
and the courts cite two main purposes of the bankruptcy process.  The first is to create a fresh 
start for the debtor.8  The “fresh start” goal is intended to encourage the debtor to “becom[e] 
reestablished as a hard-working member of society, striving to find the good life and fulfill the 
American Dream.”9  The United States Supreme Court has also characterized the fresh start as “a 
new opportunity for life, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing 
debt.”10  Bankruptcy allows for individuals and businesses to engage in risk-taking in the free-
market with limited overall risk involved to those who fail in the competitive, capitalist market.11  
 The second purpose drawn out of the Bankruptcy Code is the creation of equity among 
creditors.12  The goal is to systematically and fairly distribute the debtor’s assets among the 
creditors as proscribed by the Bankruptcy Code.13  This guarantees equal treatment among the 
creditors in similarly situated positions, which essentially creates certainty for creditors when 
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extending credit.14  The rules are designed to discourage creditors from rushing to the front of the 
line, instead promoting the negotiation of debts prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.15    
In order to understand the implications of the Bankruptcy Court exercising jurisdiction 
over the agent certification, we must identify and understand the commonly used chapters of 
bankruptcy.  Once identified, the objectives of the chapters can guide the decision on whether the 
agent certifications should be included in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  Although there are six 
potential chapters to file under, there are two types of bankruptcy proceedings commonly used 
by individuals, chapter 7 and chapter 13.16  In the 2006 fiscal year, the Federal Judiciary reported 
1,112,542 bankruptcy filings with 1,085,209 filed by individuals.17  Individuals predominantly 
used chapter 7 compared to any other form of bankruptcy with the Federal Judiciary reporting 
814,889 chapter 7 filings, 269,660 chapter 13 filings and only 658 chapter 11 filings.18  This 
paper will focus on primarily chapter 7 and chapter 13 since the statistics clearly reveal that these 
two chapters are by far the chapters in which individuals use when filing for bankruptcy.        
The most common bankruptcy filing, chapter 7, constitutes over 75% of individual 
filings.19  “Any individual residing, domiciled, or having property or a place of business in the 
United States may file a chapter 7 bankruptcy.”20  A chapter 7 filing, called a “liquidation” 
requires the appointment of a trustee to collect and sell all of the debtor’s non-exempt21 
property.22  The proceeds from the sale are distributed to satisfy the debts to creditors.23  The 
final step of a chapter 7 filing is the Bankruptcy Court granting a discharge of the remaining, 
unsatisfied debts of the debtor that were not paid-off through liquidation.24  The purpose of this 
chapter is “to achieve a fair distribution to creditors of whatever nonexempt property the debtor 
has and to give an individual debtor a fresh start through the bankruptcy discharge.”25   
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The second common bankruptcy filing, chapter 13, represents about 25% of individual 
filings.26  Any individual with “a regular income” who resides, is domiciled, or has a place of 
business or property in the United States may file for chapter 13 bankruptcy.27  An individual 
qualifies as having “a regular income” if the “income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable 
such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13.”28 This chapter allows the 
debtor to adjust his or her financial situation without resorting to liquidation of current assets.29  
Chapter 13 is used to rehabilitate a debtor with regular income through a court-confirmed plan of 
reorganization.30  The earnings and other income received after the filing of the petition is used 
under the plan to pay creditors in full or in part under a trustee’s supervision.31  The goal of 
chapter 13 is to repay creditors within a three to five year period depending on the “current 
monthly income” of the debtor.32  At the end of this court-confirmed plan, the debtor receives the 
same discharge, with some exceptions, as under chapter 7.33   
The interplay between these two chapters is significant.  Chapter 7 can be converted to 
chapter 13 at any time during the case as long as the debtor is qualified for relief under chapter 
13.34  In the same manner, a person who has commenced a chapter 13 bankruptcy can convert 
the proceeding to a chapter 7 bankruptcy.35  The important point to be made from the relative 
ease of conversion is that the courts must see chapter 7 and chapter 13 as interchangeable when 
deciding what to include as property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  Due to the easy ability to 
convert from one chapter to another, the court cannot make an asset property under one chapter 
and not property under the other chapter.  With a few exceptions, the court should be uniform 
under the Bankruptcy Code in defining “property.”  As such, this is an important limitation to 
keep in mind when addressing whether agent certifications can be property of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate.                     
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B. BACKGROUND OF AGENT CERTIFICATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (NFLPA), THE NFLPA’S REGULATORY 
SYSTEM AND THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS. 
 
 In order to represent National Football League (“NFL”) players in contract negotiations, 
the NFLPA requires that the agent obtain a certification by completing the NFLPA’s certification 
process.  The NFLPA’s intent is to ensure that qualified and competent agents are representing 
the players in their contract negotiations.  There are particular requirements that must be met 
throughout the certification process.  These requirements are set forth in the NFLPA Regulations 
Governing Contract Advisors (“The Regulations”).  The Regulations create specific personal 
requirements and duties that will be important in establishing whether the agent certification 
should be property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  Therefore, it is important to understand the 
certification process and the duties of the agents once they become certified with the NFLPA. 
The NFLPA was created, in part, to certify and authorize agents to represent the players 
of the NFL.36  In order to be considered for certification with the NFLPA, an agent must meet 
application criteria and complete the certification process.37  In accordance with the Regulations, 
a prospective agent must meet, at a minimum, the following qualifications: (1) have an 
undergraduate and post-graduate degree; (2) pass a written examination and background check; 
(3) complete appropriate application materials; (4) submit application fees; and (5) attend a 
seminar for new contract advisors.38 
Once an applicant becomes certified with the NFLPA, the agent has continuing 
obligations to the NFLPA which include, but are not limited to: (1) reporting negotiated player 
contracts; (2) acting in a fiduciary capacity at all times; (3) paying an annual fee; (4) obtaining 
professional liability insurance from an approved carrier; (5) attending one of three NFLPA 
seminars held each year for Certified Contract Advisors; (6) remaining educated regarding 
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NFLPA matters; (7) providing an updated application on an annual basis; (8) complying with all 
stated policies of the NFLPA, including the Regulations; and (9) negotiating at least one player 
contract within a three-year period.39  The agent can lose his or her certification if he or she does 
not satisfy any one of these requirements. 
Throughout the process, the NFLPA controls who becomes a certified agent and who 
remains a certified agent.  The NFLPA has the “sole and exclusive authority to determine the 
number of agents to be certified, and the grounds for withdrawing or denying certification of an 
agent.”40  Even though it is not specifically stated in the Regulations, this power retained by the 
NFLPA restricts transferability of the agent certifications.  Since the NFLPA must approve all 
potential agents through the rigorous process described above, the certified agent cannot 
unilaterally transfer the agent certification to any third party.  This control factor is significant in 
deciding whether the agent certification is property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.   
 
C. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S RELEVANCE TO NFLPA AGENT CERTIFICATIONS. 
 
The analysis of whether an agent certification is property under the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate is an important topic since a decision in either direction has financial consequences for 
debtors, creditors, and NFL players.  If the agent certification is not a part of the bankruptcy 
estate, the creditors are harmed.  Under a chapter 7 filing, the creditors have one less asset to 
liquidate and recoup some of the debt.  Also, under a chapter 13 filing, the certification will not 
be included in the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  If the certification is not under the plan of 
reorganization, the debtor may not be required to use the income produced as a result of the 
certification to satisfy the outstanding debt. 
On the other hand, negative effects of placing the certification under the Bankruptcy 
Court’s jurisdiction are felt by the debtors and the NFL players.  The harm to the actual debtor-
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agent exists under chapter 7 and chapter 13.  In a chapter 7 case, the agent’s financial problems 
will not be solved by selling the certification.  The liquidation effectively takes away the agent’s 
means of earning an income.  The agent no longer possesses the certification; thus, the agent can 
no longer represent NFL players in contract negotiations.  In the end, the agent loses his or her 
employment and the NFL player loses his agent that negotiated his current contract.  Similarly, 
in a chapter 13 case, the certification does not necessarily need to be in the plan of reorganization 
in order for the income to be used to satisfy the debts.  However, if it is under the Bankruptcy 
Court’s jurisdiction and the Court rejects the debtor’s plan of reorganization, the case may be 
converted to a chapter 7.  This, once again, implicates the problems of liquidating the debtor’s 
only means of generating income to satisfy creditors.  
The liquidation of the agent’s certification has a secondary effect on the NFL players 
represented by the agent.  If the agent loses his or her certification because of some financial 
difficulties, the player may lose his agent’s effective representation.  The player may not want to 
lose his agent because of bankruptcy proceedings.  This may result in the agent declining to 
invoke the benefits of bankruptcy to obtain the “fresh start” in fear of losing clients and income 
at a time where bankruptcy may be the most beneficial option.         
 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, RELEVANT CASE LAW INTERPRETING 
THESE STATUTES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS PREVENT AGENT 
CERTIFICATIONS FROM BECOMING PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR’S 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE. 
 
 There are two sections of the Bankruptcy Code that govern whether assets with the 
characteristics of agent certifications will be included in the bankruptcy estate.41  The first, 11 
U.S.C. § 541(a) places “[a]ll legal and equitable interests of the debtor” into the bankruptcy 
estate.42  Congress did not define “property” in the Bankruptcy Code.43  Therefore, as general of 
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a statutory statement as that language is, this statement is the closest Congress came to defining 
“property” in the Bankruptcy Code.  As a result of Congress’s decision to exclude a definition of 
“property” in the bankruptcy estate context, courts are required to interpret what constitutes 
property of the bankruptcy estate.   
 Many courts have set out guidelines for determining what constitutes property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  In the case of agent certifications, there are two important cases that are 
analogous to this inquiry.  The first case is In re Geiger, which addresses whether a driver’s 
license is a part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.44  The second case is Wade v. State Bar of 
Arizona, which discusses whether an attorney’s license to practice law is part of the estate.45  As 
will be discussed in detail, these two cases are important because they deal with non-transferable 
licenses.46  More importantly, Wade deals with a professional license that is non-transferable and 
valueless in the hands of a third party.47 
The second section, 11 U.S.C. § 365, it restricts the agent certification from becoming 
property of the bankruptcy estate because it is an executory contract for personal services.  There 
are four subsections that are important regarding the agent certifications.  The first subsection, § 
365(a), restricts the agent certification from automatically becoming part of the bankruptcy estate 
because the trustee must make a decision of whether to accept or reject the contract.48  The 
second subsection, § 365(d)(1), excludes the executory contract from the debtor’s estate unless 
the trustee assumes the contract within 60 days.49  The third subsection, § 365(b), only allows 
assumption of the contract if the trustee “cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee 
will promptly cure” the default on the contract.50  The fourth subsection, § 365(c)(1)(A)-(B), 
does not allow assumption by the trustee if it is prohibited by law and if the other party to the 
contract does not consent to the assumption.51  In the sections that follow, the reasons why the 
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agent certifications are executory contracts for personal services and why the agent certifications 
are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate are discussed in relation to § 365 and its 
relevant subsections.          
 
A. AGENT CERTIFICATIONS WITH THE NFLPA ARE NOT PROPERTY OF THE 
DEBTOR’S BANKRUPTCY ESTATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CASE LAW 
INTERPRETING § 541(A). 
 
 By examining each of the relevant statutory provisions individually, the most logical 
starting point is § 541(a).  This section makes “[a]ll legal and equitable interests of the debtor . . . 
property of the estate upon filing of bankruptcy.”52  This language seems to give the Bankruptcy 
Court a broad blanket that covers every possession of the debtor.  However, the courts do not 
interpret this language to include every possession as the language seems to suggest.  In 
particular, two cases, one from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court and one 
from the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, can be used to show that the Bankruptcy 
Court’s jurisdiction does not reach an NFLPA agent certification.53  By examining these two 
cases, it is evident that the agent certification is not property when analogizing agent 
certifications to the licenses dealt with by the courts. 
 
1. Agent Certifications with the NFLPA Do Not Meet the Three Prong 
Test Created by In re Geiger. 
  
The Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court case of In re Geiger placed specific limitations on 
what is considered property of the estate in bankruptcy.  In this case, the court established a three 
prong test to identify whether a debtor’s license was property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.54 
The court held that the possession must (1) be transferable, (2) have a tangible pecuniary or 
marketable value, and (3) be capable of financial quantification.55  The case is a guideline in 
examining whether an agent’s certification is property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.       
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The court in Geiger was deciding whether the debtor’s driver’s license should be 
included in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.56  The court specifically held that the license was not 
property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate because it was not transferable, did not have a tangible 
pecuniary or market value, and it was incapable of financial quantification.57  Even though the 
debtor argued that other decisions have held that liquor licenses58 and other commercially 
oriented licenses are property of the bankruptcy estate, the Court stated that the driver’s license is 
more akin to a FCC license59 or medical licenses,60 which are not considered property of the 
bankruptcy estate.61  By analyzing the agent certifications in accordance with this ruling, it is 
evident that the agent certification does not meet any prong of the test.   
 
i. Agent certifications with the NFLPA are nontransferable. 
 
The requirement that the license be transferable essentially hinges on the restrictions 
imposed by the issuer and personal characteristics of the license.  In each of the cases, the 
applicant must pass a test in order to obtain the license. 62  Once the test is passed by the 
individual, the personal nature of the certification does not allow the license to be passed to 
whomever the license-holder chooses.  In contrast, the liquor license only requires an application 
and payment of the license fee if there are licenses available.  These licenses are not personal in 
nature and can be transferred from licensee to any third party on the open market.63    
The NFLPA’s agent certifications are non-transferable by the certified agent.  The 
Regulations do not allow for the transferability of the certification from a certified agent to a 
third party.64  In contrast to the idea of free transferability by the certified agent, the Regulations 
specifically authorize the NFLPA as the sole and exclusive authority of determining how many 
individuals hold certifications.65  Furthermore, the NFLPA’s stringent application and 
certification process controls which applicants will hold certifications.  The Regulations 
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requirement that the applicant pass an examination makes this certification agent specific.  In 
addition, the NFLPA further personalizes the certification beyond the requirement of passing an 
examination.  The certified agent must attend a NFLPA sponsored seminar, hold undergraduate 
and post-graduate degrees and submit to a background check.66  The characteristic of the agent 
specific certifications make these non-transferable; thus, an agent certification with the NFLPA 
cannot meet the first prong under Geiger.  
 
ii. Agent Certifications with the NFLPA do not have tangible 
pecuniary or market value. 
 
The second prong of the Geiger analysis requires that the license have a pecuniary or 
market value.67  The Geiger court found that the debtor’s driver’s license did not have a 
pecuniary or market value.68  The court does not discuss this element; however, it can be inferred 
that the court found that the lack of pecuniary or market value stems from the fact that the license 
is non-transferable.  If the license cannot be transferred there will be no ready market to purchase 
a license since it is worthless upon receipt.  Even though the court did not feel it was necessary to 
fully address this prong, the simple economic analysis easily shows why there is no pecuniary or 
market value for the asset. 
Similarly, the NFLPA’s agent certifications do not have a pecuniary or market value.  
Since the NFLPA requires certification directly from its certification process and does not allow 
for the transfer from the certified agent to a third party, there is no market outside of going 
directly to the NFLPA.  There is no ready market for these certifications since they are agent 
specific.  The agent certifications are worthless in the hands of the third party, similar to the 
driver’s license’s lack of value to any person other than the actual licensed driver.   
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It is important that a pecuniary or market value exist for the license to be property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  As described earlier, under chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee liquidates all of 
the nonexempt property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.69  In order for the license to benefit the 
estate and the creditors, there needs to be a pecuniary or market value.  If the value does not 
exist, it is pointless to include in the liquidation.  This will benefit neither the debtor nor the 
creditors.  This idea is even codified in 11 U.S.C. § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code.  This section 
allows the trustee or the court to abandon property that is of inconsequential value to the estate.70   
The Geiger court does not even require dealing with the property in the first instance 
since the inconsequential property is excluded before it is placed into the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate.  By excluding the property before it enters the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, the process 
become more efficient and less expensive.  Furthermore, the exclusion benefits the debtor and 
creditor since it is more important that the debtor retain the certification so that he or she can 
continue to earn income from the certification.  This course of action is more effective in 
satisfying the debts to creditors.  It is evident that the non-transferability of the agent certification 
essentially makes it valueless to the market; thus, the second prong of Geiger is not met.  
 
iii. Agent certifications with the NFLPA are incapable of 
financial quantification. 
  
 The third and final prong of the Geiger test requires that the license be capable of 
financial quantification.71  The agent certification is the closest to meeting this prong of the test, 
yet it still does not meet the third prong.  The financial quantification of the certification could be 
the value paid to obtain the certification from the NFLPA.  The NFLPA requires an annual non-
refundable application fee of $1650.00.72  Even though this application fee may seem like a 
logical and simple solution to meeting this prong of the Geiger test, there are two problems. 
 - 14 -
 The first problem is that the Geiger court did not find that the driver’s license was 
capable of financial quantification.73  Similar to the agent certification, a driver’s license also has 
an application fee that must be paid in order to obtain the license.  Even though this application 
fee existed, the court did not find that a fee for obtaining the certification amounted to financial 
quantification.  Therefore, the application fee should not be relied upon in this case to establish 
that it is capable of financial quantification.  The second problem is that the application fee is 
non-refundable.74  Once the fee is paid, it cannot be recovered by anyone if the holder intends to 
discontinue representing NFL players.  If a third party that obtained the certification could return 
the certification and receive the application fee in return, then it would be capable of financial 
quantification.  Therefore, in accordance with Geiger and the application process of the NFLPA, 
the agent certification cannot meet the third prong of the Geiger test.  
 Under the test set forth in Geiger and analogizing the agent certification to the licenses in 
the above cited cases, the agent certification cannot be considered property of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate.  The Geiger court’s interpretation of § 541 would preclude a court from 
placing the agent certification in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate since it is non-transferable, has 
no tangible pecuniary or market value, and is incapable of financial quantification.  
 
2.  Agent Certifications with the NFLPA are Analogous to Attorney 
Licenses as Addressed in Wade v. State Bar of Arizona. 
 
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel specifically examined in Wade v. State 
Bar of Arizona nontransferable professional licenses.75  The issue of whether nontransferable 
professional licenses are property of the bankruptcy estate came before the court in the form of 
an attorney’s license to practice law.76  The court stated that “[a] nontransferable professional 
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license . . . is not a property interest.”77  The court relied upon two specific statements in ruling 
that nontransferable professional are not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.78 
The Court first relied on Wisner v. Wisner.79  The Wisner court held that professional 
licenses certifying a person to practice medicine are not considered property of the estate due to 
the nontransferability.80  The court supported this holding when it stated that the license could 
not be considered property of the estate because it was not subject to joint ownership.81  The 
second case cited by the Wade court, In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., addressed Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) licenses.82  The court reasoned that the debtor’s FCC 
license was not property of the estate because of the issuer’s retained “authority to strip [D.H. 
Overmyer] Telecasting of its broadcasting license, and may also refuse to allow [D.H. 
Overmyer] Telecasting to transfer or assign its license.”83  The court relied on the 
nontransferability, or at least the restriction on transferability, as the reason for holding that the 
license is not property of the bankruptcy estate. 
The three cases mentioned in the previous paragraph, Wade, Wisner, and Telecasting, and 
the case analyzed in the previous section, Geiger, all hold that professional certifications that are 
nontransferable or where the issuer retains the authority to restrict transferability are not property 
of the bankruptcy estate.  Similar to the certifications in these four cases, the NFLPA’s agent 
certifications are nontransferable professional certifications.  The extreme personal nature and 
requirements from the NFLPA make these nontransferable or at the very least place restrictions 
on transferability as the FCC did in Telecasting.  Either factor alone restricts the free 
transferability of the agent certification; thus, the agent certification is not property of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate.   
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Readers may notice one common thread that runs through all the cases that one may 
argue distinguishes those licenses from NFLPA issued agent certifications.  This common thread 
is that all these licenses are issued by a government agency.  It may be argued that since the 
agent certification is issued by the NFLPA and not the government, it should not receive the 
same type of exemption that governmental licenses receive. This argument can be dispelled by 
examining the delegated authority received by the NFLPA.  Congress, through the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), delegates exclusive authority to unions to handle the operation 
and administrative decisions of their union.84  This delegation by Congress through the NLRA is 
analogous to the Supreme Court of Arizona delegating its authority to the State Bar of Arizona.  
The State Bar of Arizona is a private entity, but receives the same exemption that other 
governmental units receive due to the governmental oversight.  In Wade, the court still found that 
the State Bar had the necessary oversight so that the attorney license was not part of the 
bankruptcy estate.85 As a result of Congress’s oversight through the National Labor Relations 
Board, the nontransferable agent certification is not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.          
 
B. NFLPA AGENT CERTIFICATIONS ARE NON-ASSUMABLE UNDER § 365. 
 
 The NFLPA’s agent certification cannot automatically become a part of the bankruptcy 
estate since it is an executory contract for personal services pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365.  In 
order for an executory contract to become a part of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee must decide 
whether to accept or reject the contract.86  Congress specifically set forth in § 365(d)(1) that the 
executory contract does not automatically become part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate since it 
must be assumed by the trustee within 60 days; if it is not assumed it is deemed rejected.87  
However, the trustee’s decision is only relevant if the other party to the contract (the NFLPA) 
consents to the trustee’s assumption.88  Before addressing these issues, it is necessary to address 
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how this agent certification is subject to § 365.  This requires discussing what makes the agent 
certification an executory contract for personal services.  
In order to be an executory contract, the certification must have all the necessary 
elements of a contract.  A contract is formed when there is a valid offer, acceptance, and 
consideration.89  The applicant makes an offer by submitting his or her application for 
certification as a NFLPA agent to the NFLPA.  The NFLPA accepts the offer by issuing a 
certification.  The NFLPA provides adequate consideration by maintaining an exclusive and 
regulated environment for certified NFLPA agents to represent NFL players.90  This exclusive 
and regulated environment provides the agents with an advantageous environment where players 
can feel secure that their agent, by holding a certification, is qualified and competent to negotiate 
with NFL teams.  The certified agent provides adequate consideration by paying the required 
annual fee and agreeing to act in a fiduciary manner at all times.91   
 The NFLPA application for agent-specific certification is further evidence of the 
existence of a contract between the NFLPA and an accepted applicant.  The application states, 
[i]n consideration for the opportunity to obtain Certification and in consideration 
of the NFLPA’s time and expense incurred in the processing of my application for 
such Certification, I further agree that this Application and the Certification, if 
issued to me, along with the NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors 
shall constitute a contract between the NFLPA and myself.92 
 
This language clearly concedes that a contract exists.  Even without this language, there is valid 
offer, acceptance, and consideration; thus, the NFLPA’s agent certification is a contract. 
The NFLPA’s agent certification is not only a contract, but it is an executory contract.  
An executory contract is one where the parties on both sides have a duty to performance to some 
extent.93  To be more specific, “a contract is executory if ‘the obligations of both parties are so 
unperformed that the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material 
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breach and thus excuse the performance of the other.’”94  While an “executory contract” is not 
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, its legislative history has been interpreted to agree with the 
definition from Helms.95  The NFLPA agent certification is an executory contract because it 
contemplates performance by both parties into the future.96 
 In regards to the NFLPA’s agent certification, it requires future performance from both 
sides.  Among other requirements, the certified agent must pay an annual fee, attend an annual 
NFLPA seminar on contract negotiations, comply with all provisions of the Regulations, remain 
educated regarding NFLPA matters, and act in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of all players at all 
times.97  Similarly, the NFLPA has outstanding obligations that would result in a material breach 
of the contract if they are not performed.  It must maintain an exclusive environment in which 
only certified agents are allowed to negotiate contracts on behalf of the players, regulate agent 
behavior through the Regulations, and act as the exclusive organization to certify agents.98  
Failure by either party to perform any of their outstanding obligations would result in a material 
breach.  Therefore, in accordance with Helms, the fact that both parties have outstanding 
obligations makes the NFLPA’s agent-specific certifications executory contracts between the 
certified agent and the NFLPA.99  
 This executory contract is a contract for personal services due to the personal 
requirements that the NFLPA expects from the applicants.   The Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Texas held that an agent-principal contract was a personal service 
contract.100  The court in Clay was addressing a contract where an insurance agency delegated its 
authority to contract with the insured individuals to specific insurance agents.101      
In the same manner as the insurance company delegating its authority to contract to the 
agents, the NFLPA delegates its authority to contract directly with NFL players and represent 
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them in contract negotiations to certified agents.  Furthermore, it is even more apparent that the 
NFLPA’s agent certifications are personal in nature compared to the principal-agent contract in 
Clay, since the applicant must have an undergraduate and post-graduate degree; pass a written 
examination; subject himself or herself to a background check; complete appropriate application 
materials; submit application fees; and attend a seminar for new contract advisors.102  Such 
requirements are so specific to the individual that the certifications are not transferable or 
assumable by another individual.   
Since the NFLPA’s agent certification is an executory contract for personal services, 
there are three specific reasons that it cannot be assumed by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate.  
These three specific reasons will be addressed individually.  All three of these reasons standing 
alone can restrict the agent certification from inclusion into the bankruptcy estate. 
 
1. Executory Contracts for Personal Service are Non-assumable by the 
Bankruptcy Estate’s Trustee in Accordance with In re Clay. 
 
 The agent certifications through the NFLPA are not assumable by the trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate since it is an executory contract for personal services.  The Bankruptcy Court 
in Clay excluded the debtor-agent’s principal-agent contract with the insurance company from 
his bankruptcy estate upon filing bankruptcy.103  The court stated that since the contract was an 
executory contract for personal services, it could not be assumed into the bankruptcy estate.104  
In response to the trustee’s argument, the court relied upon Williams v. Tomer (In re Tomer)105 
and ruled that the agreement could not be a part of the estate because it was an executory 
contract for personal services.106 
 In following the analysis of the Clay court, its reliance on Tomer, and direct conclusion 
that the personal service characteristic of an executory contract automatically excludes the 
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contract from the bankruptcy estate would also preclude an NFLPA agent certification from the 
bankruptcy estate.  As addressed previously, the agent certification possesses the same 
characteristics that qualify the contract in Clay as an executory contract for personal services.  As 
such, in accordance with Clay, the agent certification is not assumable by the trustee of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate.   
 
2. The Bankruptcy Estate’s Trustee Cannot Adequately Cure the 
Default as Required by 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A). 
 
 The agent certification cannot become property of the bankruptcy estate since the default 
that would occur from the non-performance of the debtor-agent cannot be cured by the 
bankruptcy estate’s trustee as required by 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).  This section restricts the 
bankruptcy trustee from assuming the executory contract unless the trustee “cures, or provides 
adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure” the default on the contract.107  Due to the 
personal nature of the executory contract between the NFLPA and the certified agent, the trustee 
cannot adequately cure the default that would result if the Bankruptcy Court obtains control of 
the debtor-agent’s certification. 
 The agent certification issued by the NFLPA is not assumable by a bankruptcy trustee 
because someone who wishes to represent NFL players must meet the specific qualifications 
required to obtain an agent certification.  Since the potential agent must have a post-graduate 
degree; pass a written examination and background check; complete appropriate application 
materials; submit application fees; and attend a seminar for new contract advisors, any random 
person cannot cure the defaults of the debtor-agent.108  Because these requirements are specific 
to an individual, and are neither transferable nor assumable by another individual, the trustee 
cannot provide the assurance required under the Bankruptcy Code to cure the debtor-agent’s 
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default.109  The default would be related to the debtor-agent’s inability to represent the NFL 
players as required by the Regulations and in accordance with his agent certification.  The trustee 
cannot cure this default because it is specific to the debtor-agent and the trustee would not be 
able to take the debtor-agent’s place to represent his or her clients.  Therefore, pursuant to § 
365(b)(1)(A), the agent certification is not assumable by the trustee of the bankruptcy estate. 
 
3. The Bankruptcy Estate’s Trustee Cannot Assume the Agent 
Certification Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). 
 
The third and final reason that the agent certification issued by the NFLPA is not 
assumable by the bankruptcy trustee is a result of the restrictions placed on the trustee by 11 
U.S.C. § 365(c)(1). The first exception provides that a trustee may not assume an executory 
contract if  
applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract . . . from 
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the 
debtor or the debtor in possession whether or not such contract . . . prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties.110  
 
The second exception provides that a trustee may not assume an executory contract if the party to 
the contract with the debtor does not consent to such assumption.111   
Under the first exception, the applicable law is § 9(a) of the NLRA, which delegates 
exclusive authority to the NFLPA to handle its operations.112  The authority extended to the 
NFLPA includes the exclusive ability to enact agent regulations, and the process to grant 
certification to these agents.  The debtor-agent does not have this authority, so he or she cannot 
pass his or her agent-specific certification on to the trustee.  Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code, 
the NFLPA is excused from accepting performance, if performance was even possible, from 
anyone besides the original certified agent, i.e. the debtor-agent. 
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Under the second exception, the NFLPA must expressly consent to the assumption of the 
agent certification by the bankruptcy trustee.113  The Regulations state that the NFLPA “shall 
have sole and exclusive authority to determine the number of agents to be certified, and the 
grounds for withdrawing or denying certification of an agent.”114  As addressed earlier, this does 
not allow for the certified agent to essentially become a certifier by transferring his or her 
existing certification.  The NFLPA chose not to allow non-certified agents to become certified 
through a transfer of agent certifications, which is what would happen if the trustee was able to 
assume the agent certification.  Thus, the agent certification is neither assumable by law nor 
assumable without the consent of the NFLPA. 
 
III. ALTHOUGH ONE CAN ARGUE THAT 11 U.S.C. § 541 SHOULD BE 
INTERPRETED BROADLY, THE AGENT CERTIFICATION DOES NOT FALL 
INTO THE BROAD INTERPRETATION. 
 
 Proponents of including the agent certification as property of the bankruptcy estate will 
generally advocate that the agent certification fits as property under 11 U.S.C. § 541.  As 
discussed in Section II of this paper, § 541 makes “[a]ll legal and equitable interests of the debtor 
. . . property of the estate upon filing of bankruptcy.”115  In order to support their contention that 
the certification should not be viewed in accordance with Geiger and Wade, the advocates will 
point to number of cases that stand for the idea that the scope of the property interests included in 
the bankruptcy estate should be construed broadly, while the scope of the exclusions should be 
construed narrowly.116  Furthermore, they will argue that the congressional intent of § 541 is that 
the scope of property interests included in the estate be broad, while the scope of exclusions be 
narrow.117   
  The cases that stand for this proposition are not analogous to the agent certifications 
issued by the NFLPA.  These cases deal with licenses that are either a non-professional license, 
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transferable, or non-personal to the applicant.118  For example, in the Miller case, the court was 
dealing with a liquor license.119  As previously discussed, liquor licenses are transferable and 
have significant value on the open market since these licenses are typically limited in quantity 
and financially lucrative for subsequent possessors to own.120  
On the surface, this argument seems like a logical approach.  The court should just throw 
every possible property interest of the debtor into the bankruptcy estate.  While generally it 
would be beneficial to the debtor to include every possible asset in the bankruptcy estate, there 
are some consequences associated with inclusion.  The advocates of placing the agent 
certification in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate are seeking short term satisfaction of debts.  By 
including the agent certification in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the trustee can liquidate the 
certification and payoff the creditors with the sale price.  However, dispossessing the debtor of 
his or her certification and liquidating the certification has the long term effect of closing off the 
debtor’s ability to earn an income with the certification.  This income will arguably generate 
more money for the creditors than liquidating an agent certification since the certification is 
useless to the third party.   
The approach of throwing all of the debtor’s property into the bankruptcy estate is an 
approach of some courts.  The trustee of the estate may find that the agent certification’s 
headaches and problems are outweighed by the inconsequential value to the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate.  In this case where the court decides to include all the property without excluding the 
agent certification, the trustee has an opportunity to relieve itself of this problem.  “The trustee 
may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”121  As discussed above, the agent certification 
does not have a market value to third parties; therefore, if a court decides to use a broad 
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definition of “property,” the trustee should recognize the agent certification’s inconsequential 
value.  The estate should then abandon the certification since there is no beneficial value.     
The decision by either the Bankruptcy Court or the trustee to exclude the agent 
certification from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate allows the debtor to continue to earn an income 
and use the income to pay the creditors during the bankruptcy proceeding.  In the end, this course 
of action will be more beneficial to every party involved.  The income can supplement the 
monies received from liquidation in chapter 7 and can help the plan of reorganization in chapter 
13.  Thus, it is more beneficial to allow the debtor to continue representing the NFL players with 
the agent certification rather than taking the agent certification away and either liquidating it or 
attempting to have the trustee perform a contract that he or she cannot legally perform. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The decision by the court, electing to place the agent certification into the bankruptcy 
estate, can have unanticipated long term consequences.  It is easy to overlook the consequences 
at first.  If the court does not examine what the effects on the debtor, and essentially the creditor, 
will be, then it is easy to include every asset of the debtor in the estate.  However, as we have 
seen, placing the agent certification in the hands of the trustee will, more likely than not, hurt the 
parties involved rather than meet the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, giving the debtor a fresh 
start and equity among creditors.  The delay caused by allowing the trustee 60 days under § 
365(d)(1) to accept the agent certification into the debtor’s bankruptcy estate harms the debtor no 
matter how the trustee subsequently decides.  This 60 day period leaves the debtor uncertain 
about his or her future.  Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court should take this decision relating to 
agent certifications out of the hands of the trustee.  Even if the Bankruptcy Court leaves this 
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decision to the trustee, the agent certification’s characteristics prevent it from becoming part of 
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  
 Based on the existing case law that is most analogous with the agent certifications, it is 
appropriate to view this in line with other professional licenses.  Courts should follow the rulings 
in Wade and Geiger that restrict the inclusion in the bankruptcy estate if the issuer restricts 
transferability.122  The reason that this approach should be taken results from the inherent 
problem that exists when the license is non-transferable.  If the issuer restricts transferability in 
any manner the license becomes valueless.  The fact that the transferee cannot be certified by the 
certified agent through a mere transfer makes the license of no or possibly nominal value to the 
transferee.  This does nothing to benefit the bankruptcy estate.  It is more important for the 
debtor to hold the certification and use it to earn an income during and subsequent to the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  
 Furthermore, the courts should also conclude that not only is this not property in the 
general sense, since it is an executory contract for personal services.  The agent certification fits 
the definition of these contracts; thus, it is governed by the § 365 and its relevant subsections of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  As we have seen, the executory contract cannot be assumed because the 
trustee cannot cure the defect.  Further, even if the trustee was qualified to cure the defect, the 
personal service contract is not assumable by law.  Based on the statutory language and common 
law jurisprudence, there are multiple reasons that, standing alone, would not place the agent 
certification as property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  The law as it currently stands, policy 
reasons, and the consequences affecting all of the parties to assumption justify the exclusion of 
the agent certification issued by the National Football League Players Association from the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate.     
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